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PROTECTING PLAINTIFFS' SEXUAL PASTS: COPING WITH 
PRECONCEPTIONS THROUGH DISCRETION 
Jane H. Aiken* 
INTRODUCTION 
We expect judges to demonstrate judicial temperament when deciding 
cases. We rely on the judge, the gatekeeper of the evidence, to keep improper 
evidence out of the hearing of the jury. Yet, we should not expect that judges 
are free of cultural beliefs that affect everyone. Legislators create rules of 
evidence to streamline trials, give guidance to litigants on what they can expect 
to encounter when presenting a case, assist in ensuring that litigants offer 
competent evidence upon which fact finders can rely, and serve community 
goals. Legislators also design rules of evidence to cure cultural preconceptions 
that give undue probative value to materials that we choose not to find relevant 
for social policy reasons. Rules barring the admission of these types of 
materials ensure that judges and juries will not indulge their biases. The 
clearer the rule, the more likely the bias will be overcome. In the federal 
courts, one of the primary rules of evidence designed to remedy the problem of 
undue probative value in the admission of evidence is Rule 412, the so-called 
"Rape Shield Rule.,,1 
In 1994, Congress made significant changes to the rules, including 
clarifying the criminal rule and extending it to civil actions? Litigants had 
long awaited the extension of Rule 412 to civil actions. Plaintiffs in actions 
premised on sexual misconduct had noted that the same concerns that give rise 
to the need for rape shield legislation in criminal cases also arise in civil cases. 
Indeed, given the disparity in resources between a typical plaintiff and a typical 
defendant in a sexual harassment case, plaintiffs' need for protection may be 
even greater than that of victims of sexual assault testifying in criminal cases. 
• Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Michelle 
Nasser, Joan Richey, Jennifer Shymanik, Anne Praffath, and Matt Hooper who have been extremely helpful in 
researching and discussing this Article. The author also wishes to thank Washington University School of 
Law for generous research grants and Katherine Goldwasser for her insight and support. 
I FED. R. EVID. 412. 
2 FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's notes. 
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Corporate defendants' access to seemingly unlimited resources to probe a 
plaintiffs background for evidence of her sexual past, often would dissuade 
her from proceeding with her claim. In this regard, extending the rule to 
protect plaintiffs made good sense. 
Unfortunately, use of the word "extension," which implies that Congress 
simply added the words "and civil actions" to the criminal rule, is misleading. 
Instead, Congress drafted a special rule for civil cases. Unlike the criminal 
rule, this civil rule does not absolutely preclude the admission of a plaintiffs 
past sexual conduct or predisposition except in particular circumstances.3 
Instead, it leaves to judges the duty of balancing whether the probative value of 
the proffered evidence substantially outweighs the prejudice to a party or the 
harm to the victim.4 
In the last eight years since this new civil rule has been in place, courts 
have applied it in an unpredictable manner; evidence of a victim's sexual past 
is admitted in some cases but not in others even when the proffered evidence is 
substantially similar. Congress' choice to use a rule that depends on judicial 
discretion for enforcement leaves open many avenues for the importation of 
evidence that defeats the very purpose of the rule. The purpose of Rule 412 is 
to prevent juries from placing excess probative value on matters that should 
not affect their decisions-namely, a victim's or plaintiffs sexual history. 
However, the remedy selected on the civil side-charging judges with 
assessing probative value-may be just as troubling. What makes Congress 
sure that judges can make that determination without allowing themselves to 
be biased by their own cultural preconceptions? 
Another point of concern is that, currently, civil defendants have virtually 
unrestricted access to a plaintiff s sexual past during the discovery stage of the 
litigation. Rule 412 is a rule of evidence, not a rule of discovery.5 Yet, in 
theory, its presence could have some effect on the assessment of what might be 
relevant evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. 6 However, 
because Rule 412 makes an admissibility determination a mere guess, only in 
the most egregious cases would such evidence not be discoverable. As is clear 
3 Compare FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(l) (specifying when sexual history evidence is admissible in criminal 
trials), with FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2) (providing for a more relaxed standard for the admission of sexual history 
evidence). 
4 Id. 
5 FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's notes. 
6 Id. 
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from the legislative history of Rule 412, civil defendants use the threat of such 
discovery to intimidate plaintiffs into dropping their cases. 
Part I of this Article traces the development of the civil application of Rule 
412. Part n analyzes the inconsistencies within the cases decided under the 
new civil rule and links those inconsistencies to the language of the rule. It 
identifies the trends within the cases about what constitutes probative value for 
purposes of the rule and how courts assess prejudice. The Article concludes 
that rules of evidence designed to remedy bias of fact finders should not be 
cast as discretionary. Many of the problems that arise in the interpretation of 
Rule 412 could be solved, if the civil application of Rule 412 were as specific 
and nondiscretionary as the criminal rule. Therefore, in Part TIl, the Article 
proposes a rule designed to offer such specificity. 
l. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 412 
When Congress revised Rule 412 to include civil suits, it was working with 
a rule that had been in place since 1978? Congress adopted the original Rule 
412, or Federal Rape Shield Law, not through the usual rule-making process, 
but through a separate piece of legislation, popularly known as the "Privacy 
Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978.,,8 The Rule was applicable only to 
victims of rape or attempted rape in criminal proceedings.9 It reflected 
congressional consensus that, in most instances, evidence of a rape victim's 
prior sexual history is irrelevant to a determination of whether a rape has 
occurred. to Rape shield laws are also grounded in important considerations of 
7 Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046 (1978). 
8 [d. 
9 /d. 
10 Saying that such evidence is irrelevant may be too strong in light of the fact that the relevance 
threshold of Rule 40 I is extremely low: Does this piece of evidence make the fact of consequence more or less 
probable than without the evidence? At least in the case in which the question is "did the woman consent to 
the sexual act," the fact that the alleged victim has had a number of sexual partners may shed some light on 
whether she voluntarily had sex on this occasion. The argument that rape is a crime of violence, not of sex, 
ignores popular notions about rape victims. The issue is not why the rape occurred but whether it occurred. 
The court or jury is being asked to determine which account is more credible, the defendant's or the 
complainant's. The evidence of the complainant's prior sexual history cuts for and against her. The fact that 
she has had many instances of sex in the past may make it somewhat more likely that she had sex on this 
occasion. Likewise, the fact that she had sex on prior occasions and did not call it rape and now is calling it 
rape suggests that she is being truthful on this occasion. Because the evidence cuts both ways, the question 
then becomes whether admission of the evidence is more prejudicial than probative. Because juries may not 
treat a sexually active woman with as much respect as a woman who is not sexually active, or whom they have 
no information about, exclusion of this marginally relevant evidence is proper. 
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extrinsic social policy. Congressional debate focused on the then common 
practice of allowing the victim's character to be offered in evidence by the 
defendant under Rule 404(a)(2).11 This practice shifted the inquiry from the 
guilt or innocence of the accused to the supposed morality of the victim. 
Congress concluded that the practice had resulted in various negative social 
effects, such as humiliating the victim, deterring rape victims from reporting 
the crime, and expending valuable judicial resources on collateral matters. 12 
Rule 412, as adopted by Congress in 1978, limited the admissibility of a 
victim's sexual past in criminal trials for rape and attempted rape, and provided 
a procedure by which a judge could determine admissibility prior to trial. 
Some commentators criticized the rule as cumbersome and confusing. 13 In 
1988, Congress amended the rule to expand its coverage to criminal 
prosecutions for any sexual offense, including, but not limited to, rape. 14 
Critics continued to raise concerns about difficulties in applying the rule, as 
well as significant constitutional issues. In response to many of the concerns 
about Rule 412, Congress, in 1993, considered amending the rule through 
legislation (again avoiding the usual rule-making process). Due to the sense of 
immediacy in Congress, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules of the 
Judicial Conference, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, drafted amendments to Rule 412. After an expedited period of review, 
the committees submitted the amended rule to the Supreme Court. 15 
In addition to addressing chronic problems with the criminal application of 
Rule 412, the Adviso~ Committee recommended that the rule be expanded to 
apply to civil actions. 6 At that time, evidence of the plaintiff's prior sexual 
history was routinely admitted in civil cases involving sexual misconduct. 
Plaintiffs were asked about past experiences, including questioning about 
former rapes, child abuse, mastectomies, abortions, venereal disease, whether 
they had sex with animals, or whether they watched X-rated movies. 17 Their 
II 124 CONGo REC. 34,912-13 (1978). 
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g., Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for 
the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 883-93 (1986). 
14 Pub. L. No. 100-690, §7046, 102 Stat. 4181, 4400 (1988). 
15 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5381.1, 
at 159-60 (Supp. 1997). 
16 This may have been an effort to head off a more drastic congressional amendment then under 
consideration. 
17 Ellen E. Schultz & Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy: Plaintiffs' Sex Lives Are Being Laid Bare in 
Harassment Cases-Defense Lawyers Use Tactic To Counteract Litigants as Suits Get More Costly-What 
Evidence Is Irrelevant?, WALL ST. J .. Sept. 19, 1994, at A I. 
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sexual fantasies were fodder for courtroom testimony and extensive 
discovery.18 Because the original Rape Shield Rule only applied in a criminal 
context, it did not prohibit the defendant from implying that the victim had 
invited his attention or that she did not deserve protection. 19 Consequently, 
plaintiffs often dropped their suits in order to avoid probing inquiries and 
innuendo about their sex lives. Essentially, these civil defendants urged judges 
and juries to engage in the same logical inferences that Congress found so 
troubling in a criminal context.20 If the inference is improper in the criminal 
context, it is difficult to justify allowing it in the civil context. Congress 
recognized this as a significant deterrent to the effective implementation of 
Title VII and to the reduction of violence against women. The Advisory 
Committee described the reason for the extension of Rule 412 to civil matters 
as "obvious," noting that: 
The need to protect alleged victims against invasions of privacy, 
potential embarrassment, and unwarranted sexual stereotyping, and 
the wish to encourage victims to come forward when they have been 
sexually molested do not disappear because the context has shifted 
from a criminal prosecution to a claim for damages or injunctive 
relief.21 
It appeared to be a small change to extend the protection provided to 
victims in criminal cases to plaintiffs in civil cases. However, as discussed 
below, although consistent in theory with its criminal counterpart, this "small" 
change would substantially limit what had become a traditional defense used in 
sexual harassment cases. The Advisory Committee notes to the 1994 
amendment states: 
The rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of 
privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is 
associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the 
infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact finding process. Rule 412 
seeks to achieve these objectives by barring evidence relating to the 
alleged victim's sexual behavior or alleged sexual predisposition, 
whether offered as substantive evidence or for impeachment, except 
18 See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986). 
19 FED. R. EVID. 412 (1978). 
20 In the worst cases, jurors appeared to believe that women who violated rigid norms about appropriate 
sexual conduct did not deserve to recover even if a violation could be proven. See, e.g., Linda J. Kreiger & 
Cindi Fox, Evidentiary Issues in Sexual Harassment Litigation, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 115 (1995): Susan 
Klein. Comment. A Survey of Evidence and Discovery Rules in Civil Sexual Harassment Suits with Special 
Emphasis on California Law, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 540 (1989). 
21 FED. R. EVID. 412(a) advisory committee's notes (revised rule 1994). 
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in designated circumstances in which the probative value of the 
evidence significantly outweighs possible harm to the victim.22 
[Vol. 51 
The Judicial Conference opposed the rule's extension to civil cases. When 
offered the Advisory Committee's recommended changes, the Supreme Court 
accepted the changes to the criminal aspect of the rule but rejected its civil 
application. In a letter to the Chair of the Judicial Conference, Justice 
Rehnquist explained that several Justices believed the amendment would 
violate the Rules Enabling Act because it could substantially alter a defense in 
workplace sexual harassment cases.23 Therefore, the Supreme Court transmitt-
ed the rule to Congress as a rule for criminal sexual misconduct cases, not for 
civil cases.24 The revised rule became law effective December 1, 1994, 
pursuant to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court.25 
Congress, however, was not satisfied with the deletion. In its view, ruling 
this evidence inadmissible would further the Congressional goal to crack down 
on sexual misconduct, taking away the unnecessary invasions of privacy that 
inhibit victims from reporting the crime of rape and prosecuting sexual 
harassment claims. Congress proceeded to pass the civil component of the 
rule, which was deleted by the Supreme Court, as a part of the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which took effect on December 1, 
1994.26 Although adopted through two separate rule-making processes, finally 
revised Rule 412, as ultimately enacted, is identical to the version originally 
proposed by the Advisory Committee.27 
Revised Rule 412 bars the admission of evidence of an alleged victim's 
past sexual behavior or sexual predisposition, subject to exceptions provided in 
the rule, in cases in which there is alleged sexual misconduct. Typical tort 
22 [d. 
23 THE CHIEF JUSTICE, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING AN AMENDMENT TO 
THE FED. R. EVID. AS ADOPTED BYTHE COURT, PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 2076, H.R. Doc. No. 103·250 (1994) 
("LETTER FROM CHIEF JUSTICE"). The federal judiciary has concurrent jurisdiction over court procedure 
because Congress delegated that authority through the Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). That act 
also precludes the Court from promulgating rules that modify substantive law. [d. See also Rules of Decision 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994). Of course Congress is not limited in its ability to change substantive law. 
24 Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence, Order from the Supreme Court (Apr. 29, 1994). 
The Supreme Court had stated in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that an alleged victim's sexually provocative 
speech or dress was relevant to determine if alleged sexually harassing behavior was welcome. 477 U.S. 57, 
68·69 (1986). The proposed rule arguably would make such evidence presumptively inadmissible because it 
constitutes evidence of "sexual predisposition." See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
25 28 U.S.c. § 2072 (1994). 
26 Pub. L. 103·322, § 40141, 108 Stat. 1796,1918·19 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2074 (1994)). 
27 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5381.1. 
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actions ansmg out of sexual misconduct include claims of assault, battery, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, seduction, 
sexual harassment, transmission of sexually transmitted disease, and negligent 
entrustment or supervisIOn. This misconduct need not constitute a criminal 
offense but can be civilly actionable. The rule overrides any other rule that 
may make such evidence admissible. 
The rule applies only to evidence of sexual conduct or predisposition of 
alleged victims of sexual misconduct.28 It appears that the rule does not 
prohibit the use of this kind of evidence to impugn the credibility of a witness 
or party in a vast array of actions.29 Also, the Advisory Committee notes do 
not offer any definition of how broad a meaning should be given to the words 
"alleged victim of sexual misconduct.,,30 It is clear that the phrase at least 
extends to witnesses who were victims of other alleged sexual misconduct 
when they testify in cases involving alleged sexual misconduct.3l 
The defense tactics that motivated the extension of Rule 412 to civil actions 
can be problematic throughout the litigation process in sexual misconduct 
cases. A classic defense strategy in these cases propounds interrogatories and 
deposition questions that require the plaintiff to disclose intimate details of her 
personallife.32 This often causes a plaintiff to reconsider whether she wants to 
28 The tenn is confusing because the terms sex and gender are often conflated. Apparently, the drafters 
intended sexual misconduct to be grounded in sexuality rather than pure gender. 
29 This is a common defense tactic to encourage plaintiffs to withdraw their claims in a wide variety of 
cases that are not premised upon sexual misconduct. In those cases, Rule 412 would not stand as a bar. See 
Schultz & Woo, supra note 17, at A I. The only limit on the use of such evidence in other cases,like those that 
involve race discrimination or run-of-the-mill tort claims, is Rule 40 I or Rule 403 objections, suggesting that 
such evidence is irrelevant or more prejudicial than probative. 
30 If there is a credibility issue to be resolved on issues that may affect whether Rule 412 applies, that 
decision is left to the jury. The amendment to Rule 412 specifically requires that issues of conditional facts are 
to be left to the jury. See United States v. Platero, 72 F.3d 806, 813 (1995). 
31 Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham discuss this problem in their treatise. They offer several 
examples of fact patterns in which the lack of definition may pose problems: 
Is the spouse of a rape victim also a "victim of alleged sexual misconduct" by virtue of the 
financial and psychological stress imposed by the crime? Is the sexual partner of the victim a 
victim if the defendant infected the victim with a sexually transmitted disease that spread to the 
partner? How about the owner of a motel who is sued for failing to protect the patron-victim 
against rape and who loses business as a result of unfavorable publicity? Is the person falsely 
accused of sexual misconduct a victim of sexual misconduct? 
WRtGHT & GRAHAM, supra note IS, § 5384.1. 
32 See Klein. supra note 20, at 546. Such tactics are used in other claims besides sex discrimination 
claims. The Wall Street Journal described a federal civil case in New York where a female office worker 
settled a race-bias case before trial. "Her lawyer says she backed off when she learned that her husband would 
be questioned about his impotence-something the defense had learned from her gynecology records." 
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proceed with the action.33 Because Rule 412 governs the admissibility of 
evidence at trial. it does not directly govern a party's behavior during the 
discovery process.34 This creates a tremendous gap in the rule because many 
more victims will go through the discovery process than will go to trial. 
Furthermore, the abuses may be more intrusive at the discovery stage because 
discovery occurs without the presence of a judge. 
The drafters were aware that the same concerns at trial existed during the 
discovery process and urged that such wholesale investigations into plaintiffs' 
sexual activities and predisposition be curbed throughout the litigation. The 
Advisory Committee notes urge judges to make liberal use of Rule 26( c) 
protective orders, to ensure that defense counsel do not undermine the intent of 
Rule 412 through the discovery process.35 Some judges have taken this 
guidance to heart: 
The logic behind the note is self-evident: one of the purposes of Fed. 
R. Evid. 412 was to reduce the inhibition women felt about pressing 
complaints concerning sex harassment because of the shame and 
embarrassment of opening the door to an inquiry into the victim's 
sexual history. This shame and embarrassment, inhibiting them from 
invoking the legal remedies available to them by laws such as the 
D.C. Human Rights Act, exists equally at the discovery stage as at 
trial and is not relieved by knowledge that the information is merely 
sealed from public viewing?6 
Arguably, discovery of sexual history or predisposition should only be 
allowed when it is likely to lead to admissible evidence; that is when the 
proponent of the evidence can show that the probative value of the evidence to 
be discovered substantially outweighs the risk of harm to the victim, or 
prejudice to any party.37 Thus, federal courts have considerable power, should 
Schultz & Woo, supra note 17, at A I. Rule 412 would do nothing to assist this plaintiff. Unless the case is 
based on sexual misconduct, the strictures of Rule 412 do not apply. 
33 Kreiger & Fox, supra note 20, at 117. 
34 Wright and Graham note that: "Revised Rule 412 does nothing about the most serious forms of abuse 
in civil cases; that is, discovery into intimate details of the plaintiffs sexual history, by defendants bent on 
harassing her into dropping her suit." WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5393.1 (footnote omitted). 
35 The Advisory Committee notes to revised Rule 412 state that "[c)ourts should presumptively issue 
protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing that the evidence 
sought to be discovered would be relevant under the facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be 
obtained except through discovery." FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's notes (revised rule). Un-
fortunately, the burden remains on the plaintiff to show good cause for a protective order against abusive 
discovery at a time in which the relevance rules are relaxed. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c). 
36 Howard v. Historic Tours of America, 177 F.R.D. 48, 51 (D.D.C. 1997). 
37 The Advisory Committee notes state: 
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they choose to exercise it, to grant protective orders to limit this line of 
defense. There has already been considerable case law supporting the 
applicability of Rule 412 to discovery?8 These cases recognize that Rule 412 
is a rule of admissibility but point to the Advisory Committee notes to support 
a closer scrutiny of discovery requests and more permissive grants of 
protective orders.39 However, the judicial discretion that protected the 
plaintiffs in these cases can just as easily be used to harm them. Moreover, at 
the discovery stage, the plaintiff must invoke the protections of Rule 412 
through a motion for a protective order.40 If the plaintiff does not move for 
such protection, apparently no bar exists to seeking the information, as long as 
the defense has a iood faith belief that such information could lead to 
admissible evidence. I Furthermore, the vagueness of 412(b)'s balancing test 
contributes to the inability of courts to know whether such discovery will lead 
to admissible evidence. 
The most significant change in Rule 412 is in the range of evidence 
excluded, subject to the exceptions of Rule 412(b)(2). The Rule excludes 
evidence of the victim's "sexual behavior.,,42 Courts have broadly defined 
"sexual behavior" as not merely sexual intercourse but conduct, which implies 
sexual contact, or even conduct of the mind such as dreams and fantasies. 43 
The Rule also excludes evidence of the victim's "sexual predisposition.,,44 The 
The procedures set forth in subdivision (c) do not apply to discovery of a victim's past sexual 
conduct or predisposition in civil cases, which will be continued to be governed by FED. R. CIY. P. 
26. In order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412, however, courts should enter appropriate 
orders pursuant to FED. R. CIY. P. 26( c) to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to 
ensure confidentiality. Courts should presumptively issue protective orders barring discovery 
unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing that the evidence sought to be discovered 
would be relevant under the facts and theories ofthe particular case, and cannot be obtained except 
through discovery .... Confidentiality orders should be presumptively granted as well. 
FED. R. EYID. 412(c) advisory committee's notes (revised rule). 
38 See, e.g., PJ. Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., 171 F.R.D. 179 (1997); 
Holt v. Welch Allyn, Inc., 1997 WL 210420 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997); Barta v. City and County of Honolulu, 
169 F.R.D. 132 (1996); Stalnaker v. Kmart Corp .. 1996 WL 397563 (D. Kan. July II, 1996); Sanchez v. 
Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500, (D.N.M. 1996); Ramirez v. Nabil's Inc., 1995 WL 609415 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995); 
Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., 1995 WL 117886 (N.D. III. Mar. 15, 1995); Burger v. Litton Indus., Inc., 1995 
WL 476712 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995). 
39 See supra note 38. 
40 At trial, the defense bears the burden of meeting the notice requirements and demonstrating the 
admissibility of the evidence. FED. R. EVID. 412(c). 
41 FED. R. CIy. P. 26. 
42 FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(1). 
43 /d. 
44 FED. R. EYID. 412(a)(2). 
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tenn "sexual predisposition" provides even broader coverage in that it 
prohibits evidence that may obliquely imply a disposition on the part of the 
alleged victim regarding such matters as dress, speech, or lifestyle.4 Rule 412 
prohibits attempts to insinuate sexual activity of the victim through the use of 
coded references that invoke sexual stereotyping. Rule 412 bars general 
evidence of sexual background that may prove either that the victim was 
"promiscuous" for the inference that she was accustomed to this kind of 
conduct and has no reason to complain,46 or that she was "virginal" and thus 
hypersensitive to such conduct.47 
Rather than articulating particular exceptions to these general rules of 
inadmissibility, the civil application leaves this to the discretion of the court 
through the use of a balancing test.48 Moreover, the civil provision's balancing 
test differs from the traditional "probative value" versus "unfair prejudice" 
balance reflected in Rule 403.49 The burden of raising a Rule 403 objection 
rests with the opponent of the evidence. Rule 412 requires the proponent to 
demonstrate that the probative value of the proffered evidence substantially 
outweighs the prejudice.so In addition to the typical prejudice evaluation, Rule 
412's balancing test adds another factor for a court to consider when 
detennining admissibility-"the danger of harm to any victim."sl The 
Advisory Committee notes offer some insight into what the rule means when it 
uses the tenn "harm," pointing to the rule's "objectives of shielding the alleged 
45 Id. 
46 See Mitchell v. Hutchings. 116 F.R.D. 481, 484-85 (Utah 1987). 
47 See Jennings v. D.H.L. Airlines, 101 F.R.D. 549 (D.C. Ill. 1984) (rejecting the defendant's attempt to 
present evidence that the plaintiff was hypersensitive). 
48 FED. R. EVID. 412(b )(2). 
49 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
50 The procedural requirements of Rule 412 offer courts another avenue for coping with the lack of 
substantive guidance provided by the Rule. In Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand and Gravel Co., Inc., the court 
candidly stated that it "need not reach the issue of whether the proffered evidence ... is admissible under Rule 
412. While such evidence might be relevant for the reasons advanced by the defendant, the Court chooses 
instead to sanction the defendant for its callous disregard of the procedural safeguards articulated in Rule 
412(c)." 895 F. Supp. 105, 109 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
Similarly, in Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogel IIlC., the court said it "is convinced that the evidence 
described above should not have been admitted. even in the absence of objection by the plaintiff." 184 F.R.D. 
113, 123 n.7 (S.D. Ohio 1999). In a footnote the court explained: 
Because Rule 412 imposes an affirmative obligation on the defendant to move, ill camera, to admit 
the evidence covered by the Rule, any failure of plaintiff to object does not mean that the error is 
waived or that defendant had no obligation to comply. Further, plaintiff made a general and 
continuous objection to matters within the purview of Rule 412. 
Id. at n.7. 
51 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2). 
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victim from potential embarrassment and safeguarding the victim against 
stereotypical thinking.,,52 The Advisory Committee reasoned that this aspect 
of the rule is grounded in the "strong social policy in not only punishing those 
who engage in sexual misconduct, but in also providing relief to the victim.,,53 
Rule 412 requires the court to assess both the "danger of harm to any 
victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.,,54 Assessing prejudice to a party is 
a fairly common task required of courts. Essentially, the court considers 
whether the evidence will sway a jury to make decisions based on improper 
inferences, will confuse the issues, or will result in a waste of time. Evidence 
of the victim's dress and conversations may cause the proceedings to digress in 
matters of little probative value. More significantly, such evidence may play 
into the stereotypical notions that Congress wanted to remove from the fact-
finding process. Allowing evidence designed to invoke such stereotypes might 
lead to an improper inference or confusion of the issues. 
The inclusion of "harm to [the] victim,,55 as a part of this balancing test 
provides the key to effective implementation of amended Rule 412. This 
additional requirement forces the court to focus on the impact of evidence on 
the victim. If the proponent of the evidence can demonstrate that the proposed 
evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules and its probative value 
substantially outweighs the harm to any victim and unfair prejudice to any 
party, then the evidence may be admissible. By requiring that the evidence be 
"otherwise admissible," the evidence must also meet the strictures of Rule 404, 
which precludes the use of evidence as inference of character to prove conduct 
• & • 'h h h 56 10 conlormlty Wit t at c aracter. 
52 FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's notes. This is an extraordinary goal for the rules of evidence. 
To some degree, all assessments of relevance depend upon determinations that may be based on certain 
assumptions or stereotypes about how and why people behave. Here Congress has identified a particular 
stereotype for special treatment due to findings that such stereotypical thinking has hampered the ability of the 
justice system to rid society of crimes of violence against women and incidences of sexual harassment. 
53 [d. The Advisory Committee stated the following as the justification for the changes in Rule 412: 
The rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential 
embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual 
details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding process. By affording victims 
protection in most instances, the rule also encourages victims of sexual misconduct to institute and 
to participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders. 
FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's notes (revised rule). 
54 FED. R. EVID. 412(b )(2). 
55 [d. 
56 FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
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II. EVALUATING ApPROPRlA TE WEIGHT WHEN PROBATIVE VALUE IS 
WEIGHTED BY PRECONCEPTIONS 
Congress may pass the rule, but judges apply it. The Supreme Court's 
resistance to the civil application of Rule 412 appears to have foreshadowed its 
limited application. Congress specifically designed the rule to affect the 
assessment of probative value. Through its adoption of Rule 412, Congress 
sought to use the rules of evidence to limit the effects of rape myths that 
permeate the fact-finding process. These myths include the idea that a victim 
must have precipitated the sexual misconduct; that women assume the risk of 
being targeted by engaging in certain behaviors; and the idea that it is the 
woman's job to be the gatekeeper of sex, and therefore are somehow 
responsible when things go awry. These ideas, widely shared by men and 
women who have traditional notions of gender roles, are sometimes relied on 
as a way of explaining why some women are victimized and others are not. 
Such evidence may be intuitively appealing, but only because it relies on 
stereotypes that are often unexamined and never identified as biased or false. 57 
Although evidence of a victim's past sexual history meets the low relevance 
threshold of Rule 401,58 Rule 412 is intended to combat these sexual myths 
and stereotypical cultural beliefs. For the Rule to work, judges must be willing 
57 David Bryden and Roger Park contend that evolving sexual mores do not justify the exclusion of prior 
sexual history evidence; rather, they merely establish a new benchmark for what constitutes normal sexual 
behavior. David Bryden & Roger Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases. 78 MINN. L. REV. 
529,569 (1994). Bryden and Park argue that changing sexual mores do nothing to dispel the relevance logic 
that women who have a large number of casual sexual partners are statistically more likely to consent than are 
women of average sexual habits and that such evidence can be useful in determining whether rape has 
occurred. [d. They note that "it is misleading to assert that 'just because she consented to one man doesn't 
mean she consented to another.' This truism confuses relevance with conclusiveness. '" [d. (footnote omitted). 
58 Some commentators argue that such evidence meets the relevance threshold through the operation of 
fundamentally sexist beliefs that include the belief that sexual entreaties at work are acceptable. See Susan 
Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 828-29 (1991). Estrich comments on the Supreme Court's 
conclusion that provocative dress is obviously relevant when determining welcomeness in sexual harassment 
cases: 
What is "sexually provocative" dress? Does the Court mean that women who wear short skirts 
intend to invite sexual advances? That tight sweaters may justly be pled as provocation for 
otherwise offensive conduct? That men are legally entitled to treat women whose clothes fit 
snugly with less respect than women whose clothes fit loosely? By accepting the notion of 
"sexually provocative" clothing, the Court effectively denies women the right to dress as they 
wish. Women who wear short skirts, take pride in their bodies, dress for themselves, go out 
directly from work, wear hand-me-down clothes, have gained weight lately, or even are trying to 
be attractive to their husbands and boyfriends are all, under the Court's view, presumed to 
welcome advances by any man on the job. 
[d. at 828-29. 
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and able to stand back from their own beliefs to determine if they are engaging 
in these stereotypical ideas in assigning the evidence probative value and in 
assessing prejudice and harm. Analytically, this means that judges must be 
willing to assess probative value without relying on traditional inferences 
about how past sexual activity or lifestyle indicates a present willingness or 
eagerness to engage in sexual activity.59 In essence, Congress is trying to use a 
rule of evidence to tell judges that an alleged victim's prior sexual history, 
offered to show that she acted in conformity with that prior conduct, should be 
given low or no probative value. As discussed below, however, implementing 
Congress' plan has proved to be quite a challenge.6o 
The Rule has not foreclosed compelling arguments of relevance. Indeed, in 
a typical sexual harassment case, a defendant could use several theories to 
establish relevance without offending Rule 412. For example, evidence of 
behavior of the alleged victim directed toward the alleged perpetrator may be 
relevant to welcomeness.61 Such evidence may also be relevant to an assess-
ment of whether the environment was subjectively abusive,62 or an assessment 
of the plaintiffs claim of injury.63 Two issues that have raised particularly 
59 Defendants have asserted a number of relevance theories in an effort to get around the forbidden logic. 
These theories have included assertions that such evidence is offered to give background to sexual comments 
made on the job; to show that the plaintiff concocted her story based on her own sexual practices; to show that 
if the events had occurred, the plaintiff would have confided in this lover; to show that her emotional distress 
was unreasonable; and to show that the plaintiffs emotional distress was caused by preexisting conditions. 
See Schultz & Woo, supra note 17, at AI. 
60 In an article in the sexual harassment litigation manual put out by ALI-ABA and the Practicing Law 
Institute, it was suggested that defendants "[tJake thorough discovery ofthe plaintiffs past behavior, activities, 
problems, and emotional distress." Nancy L. Abell et aI., Recent Developments in Sexual Harassment 
Litigation, in ROBERT B. FITZPATRICK, AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LITIGATION: PLAINTIFFS' AND DEFENDANTS' STRATEGIES 96 (1995). These authors identify the 
following relevance logic: 
Id. 
a. Careful exploration of the plaintiffs past behavior and experience may show a pattern of 
misperceiving or exaggerating events, or of sending signals inviting sexual overtures. 
b. Plaintiffs who overstate the magnitude of emotional distress caused by the harassment in 
comparison to the magnitude caused by prior trauma may undermine their credibility. 
61 That is to say if the requirement of showing that the conduct was unwelcome survives the adoption of 
the Rule. See infra notes 64-99 and accompanying text. 
62 In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff need not prove 
psychological injury in order to prove a sexually hostile work environment. 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993). Harris 
suggests that the proper inquiry is both an assessment of whether a reasonable person would have been 
offended by the harassment and whether the plaintiff was subjectively injured by the workplace behavior. Id. 
at 23. 
63 In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., the defendants sought discovery from the plaintiffs on a 
hypersensitivity theory; that is, that this plaintiff was hypersensitive to pornography as compared to the 
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difficult balancing problems are: (1) evidence offered to show "welcomeness;" 
and (2) evidence offered to show that the damages, which the plaintiff claims 
were caused by the harassment, were, in fact, caused by other sexual events 
that involved the plaintiff. Although arguably having legitimate probative 
value, both categories of evidence open the door to the use of plaintiffs' sexual 
pasts for impermissible purposes. Distinguishing when such theories of 
relevance cross that line is difficult and needs further refinement. 
A. "Welcomeness" 
"The gravaman of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual 
advances are unwelcome.,,64 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC") argued for this standard out of a concern that sexual 
harassment claims not become "a tool by which one party to a consensual 
sexual relationship may punish the other.,,65 Consequently, "welcomeness" 
has become a central defense to claims of sexual harassment. However, 
defendants frequently offer evidence of a plaintiff's sexual past to suggest that 
she welcomed the sexual approach or innuendo on a particular occasion. This 
type of evidence clearly falls within the scope of sexual behavior or 
predisposition as defined by Rule 412. Thus, this kind of evidence should be 
subject to Rule 412' s balancing test. 
Yet, courts have resisted precluding inquiry into sexual pasts when the 
relevance theory asserted is "welcomeness.,,66 Such resistance was fore-
shadowed by the Supreme Court. Indeed, concern about circumscribing the 
use of certain types of evidence of welcomeness-evidence that the Supreme 
Court had previously deemed "obviously relevant"-was precisely what 
"reasonable woman." 118 F.R.D. 525. 530 (M.D. Fla. 1988). Consequently. they requested a mental 
examination to show that her subjective reactions were unreasonable. Id. The court denied the request. stating 
that the requirement of showing that the plaintiff was affected by the environment merely required a showing 
that she was "at least as affected as the reasonable person under like circumstances." Id. at 529. Thus. it made 
no difference to her claim if she suffered more intensely than others might have. Robinson was decided before 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in which plaintiffs were allowed to make claims for damages. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991. Pub. L. 102-166. 105 Stat. 1071. A damage claim asserting emotional distress would probably 
increase the probative value of prior sexual history evidence. Certainly. a claim that the sexual harassment 
affected the alleged victim's personal sex life would make this kind of evidence extremely probative. See. 
e.g .• Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co .. 1995 WL 117886 (N.D. III. 1995). 
64 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57. 68 (1986). 
65 Brief for the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-
1979). quoted in Ann C. Juliano. Note. Did She Ask for It?: The Unwelcome Requirement in Sexual 
Harassment Cases. 77 CORNELLL. REV. 1558.1575 (1992). 
66 But see Carr. v. Allison Gas Turbine Div .• Gen. Motors Corp .. 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(suggesting that "welcome" sexual harassment is an oxymoron). 
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prompted the Court to reject the civil application of Rule 412.67 As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist put it in his letter of transmittal to Congress: "[s]ome 
Justices expressed concern that the proposed amendment [to extend Rule 412 
to civil cases] might encroach on the rights of some defendants.,,68 In 
particular, he noted that the change would impair a potential defense 
recognized in the Court's decisions in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, "which 
held that evidence of an alleged victim's sexuall~ provocative speech or dress 
may be relevant in workplace harassment cases." 9 
In 1974, Meritor plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson, met Sidney Taylor, a vice 
president of what is now Meritor Savings Bank, and inquired about a job?O 
Mr. Taylor, the branch manager, gave her an application and hired her the next 
day. Ms. Vinson started as a teller-trainee with Taylor as her supervisor. Over 
the four years in which she worked at the branch, she was consistently 
promoted until she was the assistant branch mana~er.71 Then, Ms. Vinson was 
fired for allegedly taking too much sick leave. 2 Ms. Vinson notified her 
employer that she was forced to leave her job because of constant sexual 
harassment over the prior two years. She also filed an EEOC complaint and a 
lawsuit alleging sexual harassment. The defendants, Sydney Taylor and 
Meritor Savings Bank, denied that there had been any sexual activity between 
Mr. Taylor and Ms. Vinson. They claimed that there had been no quid pro quo 
harassment, and that there had been no notice of harassment to the bank, nor 
authorization of such harassment (thus absolving the bank of liability).73 
During the eleven-day trial, Ms. Vinson described several specific incidents 
of sexual harassment, including being forced to have sex with Mr. Taylor at the 
bank during banking hours.74 She estimated that these assaults occurred forty 
to fifty times, all against her will, and some of which resulted in physical 
injury.75 Ms. Vinson testified that Taylor fondled her breasts and buttocks on 
the job, sometimes in the presence of coworkers.76 
67 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note IS, § 5381.1. 
68 LETTER FROM CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 23. 
69 /d. 
70 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59 (\986). 
71 /d. at 59-60. 
72 [d. at 60. 
73 [d.at61,70. 
74 [d. at 60. 
75 [d. 
76 She alleged other acts as well. See id. 
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The defendants introduced, at trial, numerous pieces of evidence 
concerning Ms. Vinson's dress and personal behavior at work. This evidence 
included testimony by a female coworker that Ms. Vinson wore clothes 
sufficiently revealing to provoke customer comments regarding the way she 
100ked.77 Elicited testimony 'indicated that Ms. Vinson was "very open about 
her sexuality.,,78 One example of this openness included a reported con-
versation in which Ms. Vinson described a doctor's visit to remove her IUD.79 
Another piece of evidence included testimony that she told coworkers about a 
recurring fantasy in which her deceased grandfather came back as a younger 
man and engaged in sex with Ms. Vinson for an extended time.8o The Court of 
Appeals held the trial court's admission of this evidence was in error. 8 I 
However, the Supreme Court overruled that decision, holding the evidence 
admissible as relevant to "welcomeness.,,82 
Many commentators have criticized the Meritor position that a plaintiffs 
dress, speech, and lifestyle should be taken into consideration when evaluating 
whether workplace sexual harassment was "welcome.,,83 Like evidence of 
consent in criminal prosecutions for rape, this evidence shifts the focus away 
from the offender's actions and firmly places it on the victim's behavior and 
character. The concept of "welcomeness" suggests that no matter how 
egregious the alleged perpetrator's behavior is, the behavior can be excused if 
he can suggest that the woman might have been receptive to it. 84 
77 Trial Transcript at 14, Meritor (No. 84-1979) (Jan. 30, 1980). 
78 Id. at 38, 43. 
79 Id. at 12. 
80 Id. at 23, 43, 61. The defendants offered more evidence along these lines such as testimony that Ms. 
Vinson had said that she had a sexual association with drinking milk and that she desired another woman at the 
branch to have intercourse with her. Id. at II, 80-81. 
81 Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985.) 
82 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,68-69 (1986). 
83 See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 58, at 826-34; Susan D. Ross, Proving Sexual Harassment: The Hurdles, 
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (1992); Joan S. Weiner, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: 
Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 652-53 (1997); Christina A. Bull, 
Comment, The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual Harassment Plaintiff's Speech and Dress in the 
Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 41 U.c.L.A. L. REV. 117. 149-51 (1993). 
84 Susan Estrich, in her 1991 article, Sex at Work, noted that in both quid pro quo and hostile 
environment cases, additional requirements exist to prove that the behavior was harassment, thus rendering the 
welcomeness requirement superfluous. Estrich, supra note 58, at 831. In a quid pro quo suit, it makes no 
sense to say that conditioning a job benefit upon submission to sexual acts would ever be welcome. Can there 
ever be true consent so as to make the case unactionable when a supervisor says sleep with me or you are 
fired? The analysis becomes more complicated when dealing with a claim of hostile environment. The 
elements of a hostile workplace claim require a showing that the sex-based harassment is sufficiently pervasive 
so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment. Courts have consistently 
held that this must first be evaluated from an objective viewpoint. If the environment is not objectively 
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The challenge for courts after the 1994 amendment is to determine the 
extent to which Rule 412 altered Meritor's approval of evidence of 
"welcomeness." One reading of Congress' action, in the face of the Supreme 
Court's concern, is that by legislative fiat "welcomeness" is no longer an issue 
in sexual harassment cases.85 Alternatively, even if revised Rule 412 does not 
completely rule out the defense of welcomeness, the rule arguably creates new 
limits on the admissibility of evidence of an alleged victim's past sexual 
behavior or predisposition to show welcomeness. Revised Rule 412 now 
requires courts to measure the probative value of the evidence againstthe harm 
it might inflict upon the victim and any possible unfair prejudice to a party, and 
to exclude the evidence if the probative value does not substantially outweigh 
the other considerations.86 Thus, evidence offered to prove welcomeness is no 
hostile, then there is not a cause of action. If the objective prong is met, then the plaintiff must show that she 
experienced it as hostile. As Professor Estrich notes: 
Thus the welcomeness inquiry is either utterly gratuitous or gratuitously punitive. It is gratuitous 
when the environment is not proven objectively to be hostile, because the unwelcome environment 
that is not objectively hostile does not give rise to liability in any event. It is gratuitously punitive 
if the environment is found objectively hostile, for in that case the employer can nonetheless 
escape the burden of addressing the issue, by portraying this particular woman as so base as to be 
unworthy of respect or decency, and by arguing that she thus welcomed, through her conduct, an 
environment which a reasonable woman would have perceived as hostile. 
[d. at 833 (internal quotes omitted). 
85 For a detailed discussion of the possible changes that the adoption of amended Rule 412 may have had 
on the defense of welcomeness, see Jacqueline H. Sloan, Extending Rape Shield Protection to Sexual 
Harassment Actions: New Federal Rule of Evidence 412 Undermines Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 25 Sw. 
U. L. REV. 363, 389-401 (1996). See also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5385.1 (Supp. 2001). Wright 
and Graham state: 
The [Vinson] opinion conceded that consent is not a defense but argues that the evidence is 
relevant to the ultimate fact of whether or not particular sexual advances from the plaintiffs boss 
were unwelcome to her. The Court does not state the major premise that supports that relevance 
logic. That logic has not seemed obvious to some commentators. If the enactment of Rule 412 
does not explicitly reject that logic, at least it requires courts to enunciate the logic more carefully 
and to consider the prejudice of stereotypical thinking when engaging in the balancing mandated 
by Revised Rule 412(b)(2). 
[d. (internal footnotes and quotations omitted). 
86 Prior to the adoption of the Rule, such evidence-provided it was not deemed inadmissible as pure 
character evidence under Rule 404-was merely evaluated under the traditional Rule 403 balancing test, which 
differs substantially from amended Rule 412. Rule 403 placed the burden on the opponent of the evidence to 
object, while Rule 412 places that burden squarely on the proponent. Rule 403' s test required the opponent to 
show that the prejudice outweighed the probative value, thus creating a presumption of admissibility. Rule 
412's balancing test requires that the proponent show that the probative value substantially outweighs the 
prejudice, thus creating a presumption against admissibility. Finally, Rule 403 only required an evaluation of 
unfair prejudice, while Rule 412 now requires the court to assess the potential for harm and embarrassment to 
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longer "obviously relevant.,,87 The requirement that courts assess the probative 
value, the potential harm to the victim, and the prejudice to any party identified 
before the evidence is admitted, necessitates the courts to engage in a process 
of weighing evidence that they had not been previously required to do. 
Nevertheless, some courts continue to admit sexual character evidence 
without reference to Rule 412. For example, in both Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. 
Co., Inc. and Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., the Eighth Circuit found that 
the plaintiffs use of sexually inflammatory words in the workplace precluded 
her claim of unweIcomeness without any discussion of the applicability of 
Rule 412.88 
Courts applying Rule 412 come to very different conclusions about 
admissibility even when faced with remarkably similar evidence in cases 
dealing with similar claims. In Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, the 
trial court considered evidence offered by the defendant that the plaintiff was 
sexually insatiable, had engaged in multiple affairs with married men, was a 
lesbian, and was suffering from a sexually transmitted disease.89 The 
defendants claimed that the reason they fired the plaintiff was because she had 
an affair with a married man which distracted her from her work.9o The First 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to exclude the evidence 
concerning the plaintiffs moral character or promiscuity but to allow the 
defendants to introduce evidence directly related to their theory that the 
plaintiffs relationship distracted her from work as well as any evidence of her 
allegedly flirtatious behavior toward Miranda-Velez. 91 In Barta v. City and 
County of Honolulu,92 the defendants sought to depose the plaintiffs 
roommate and coworker about their personal knowledge regarding rumors of 
the sexual conversations and activities of the plaintiff.93 The plaintiff had sued 
for sexual harassment, assault, battery, false imprisonment, infliction of 
the victim. thus adding weight to the possibility of inadmissibility. Compare FED. R. EVID. 403. with FED. R. 
EVID.412. 
87 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. 
88 Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Company. 223 F.3d 721, 736 (8th Cir. 2000): Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. 
Company Inc., 181 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 1999). By contrast, in Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogellllc., the court 
noted that evidence indicating the use of profanity by the plaintiff elicited from virtually every witness 
presented violated Rule 412 even though the plaintiff failed to object. 184 F.R.D. 113, 122-23 (S.D. Ohio 
1999). 
89 132 F.3d 848, 855-856 (I st Cir. 1998). 
90 /d. at 856. 
91 /d. 
92 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Haw. 1996). 
93 /d. at 134. 
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emotional distress, retaliation, and racial and sexual employment discrimi-
nation.94 The court found that Rule 412 should inform the discovery process.95 
The court then proceeded to limit the discovery to evidence of sexual conduct 
of the plaintiff on-duty, at the workplace, and with the named defendants, 
precluding all evidence of her sexual activity off-duty, outside of the 
workplace with nondefendants.96 This ruling, although reasonable on its face, 
still opens the door to a great deal of evidence, some of which was not relevant 
to any of her claims or legitimate defenses. 
The breadth of this type of ruling is demonstrated in Howard v. Historic 
Tours of America,97 where the court, like in Barta, faced a discovery dispute 
regarding evidence of the plaintiff s past sexual activity in a sexual harassment 
claim.98 The defendants sought to discover the plaintiffs' sexual or personal 
relationships with coworkers other than the defendants on the theory that this 
was relevant to welcomeness.99 The Howard court, however, rejected this 
inquiry as a violation of Rule 412, noting that such discovery would be 
relevant only if the defendants knew of the affairs. loo But even if there were 
such previous knowledge, the court still dismissed the relevance of this type of 
discovery: 
Such proof has probative force only if the proposition that their 
knowledge that she engaged in such behavior made it more 
reasonable for them to conclude that she would welcome their sexual 
advances becomes easier to accept than it would be without the proof 
. . .. To so conclude one would have to say that knowledge of a 
woman's engaging in a consensual relationship with a co-worker 
makes reasonable the perception that she welcomed other sexual 
advances at her place of employment. But, that perception would be 
reasonable only if it fairly could be said that a man who learns of a 
woman's affair is justified in believing that she will be as willing to 
have a sexual relationship with him as she was to have one with her 
lover. While such a perception might have been justified, in men's 
minds, in Victorian England and Wharton's "Age of Innocence" in 
America, when men discriminated between the women they married 
94 /d. at 133. 
95 /d. at 135. 
96 /d. at 135-36. 
97 177 F.R.D. 48 (D.D.C. 1997). 
98 /d. at 49-50. 
99 [d. at 51. 
100 [d. 
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and the women they slept with, it has nothing to do with America in 
1997. 101 
The court then concluded: 
Since a man cannot seriously contend in 1997 that any woman who 
has a sexual relationship with her co-worker is morally degraded, 
justifying his conclusion that she will not resist him, he is reduced to 
arguing that because a woman took one co-worker as a lover he is 
justified in his belief that she will accept him and welcome his sexual 
advances. That, in all but his imagination, is non sequitur. 102 
B. Prior Sexual History Offered To Reduce or Negate Damages 
[VO\. 51 
The 1991 Civil Rights Act established a plaintiffs right to sue for damages 
in sexual harassment claims. 103 In addition to the front and back pay claims 
that plaintiffs traditionally included in their Title VII suits, the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act allows plaintiffs to re~uest damages for the distress that the 
perpetrator's behavior caused them. 04 More often than not, these damages 
appear in the form of emotional distress claims. 105 Adding claims of emotional 
distress to a sexual harassment suit opens up new grounds of relevancy for 
evidence of the plaintiffs sexual history. For example, defendants frequently 
offer plaintiffs psychiatric and sexual history to challenge whether the alleged 
acts of the harasser caused the injury, or to try to suggest that the plaintiff was 
already emotionally disturbed and therefore should not be compensated. 
Courts often experience difficulty in determining when evidence of a 
plaintiff s sexual history is relevant in the context of emotional distress claims. 
For example, in a tort action for wrongful transmission of a sexually 
10 lid. at 52. 
102 Id. 
103 42 U.S.c. § 1981a (1994). 
104 42 U.S.c. § 198Ia(b)(3). The House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor re-
cognized that "[v]ictims of intentional discrimination often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering, 
psychological harm and related medical problems which in turn cause victims of discrimination to suffer out-
of-pocket medical expenses and other economic losses as a result of the discrimination." H.R. REP. No. 102-
40(1), at 66 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 604. See also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775, 804 n.4 (1998) ("With the amendments enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress expanded 
the monetary relief available under Title VII to include compensatory and punitive damages .... "). 
105 See, e.g., Daggitt v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 304(A), 245 F.3d 981 
(8th Cir. 2001); Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2000); Bailey v. Runyon, 220 F.3d 879 
(8th Cir. 2000); BARBARA LINDEMAN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 351-
52 (1992); Patricia Crull, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Job: A Profile of the Experience of 92 
Women. in 4 WORKING WOMEN'S INSTITUTE RESEARCH SERIES REPORT No.3 (1979). 
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transmitted disease, the trial court allowed testimony about the plaintiff s 
breast augmentation surgery, her past sexual activity, and her employment as a 
nude dancer. 106 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that a relevance objection 
did not preserve the objection to the breast augmentation. 107 The court further 
held that the prior sexual activity was directly relevant to causation for 
transmission of genital herpes,108 and that evidence of her nude dancing both 
before and after contracting the disease was probative of her claim that she 
"felt dirty."I09 
The courts' rulings on these three pieces of evidence illustrate courts' 
confusion regarding when Rule 412 should bar admission. The ruling on the 
prior sexual activity made perfect sense. This evidence was directly relevant to 
causation of a sexually transmitted disease. Therefore, the evidence had high 
probative value with little unfair prejudice or harm to the victim, provided 
causation is at issue. However, the court fails to address the most obvious 
violation of amended Rule 412-evidence of the breast augmentation. Faced 
with a simple relevance objection, it is still difficult to imagine what relevance 
logic 110 the court employed to determine this evidence admissible other than 
the impermissible invitation to a jury to write the plaintiff off as pro-
miscuous. III Defendants argued that the nude dancing evidence negated her 
claim that she "felt dirty" and therefore was relevant to that issue. I 12 Certainly, 
the fact that it is offered along with the breast augmentation testimony, which 
would clearly violate Rule 412, should cause the court to analyze its purported 
relevance carefully. 
Congress intended Rule 412 to keep the factfinder from knowing that the 
plaintiff engaged in a profession that many people connect with sexual 
promiscuity without having any actual evidence of promiscuity.113 Despite 
legislative intent, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis did not treat the nude dancing 
as offensive. The defendant's relevance logic went something like this: 
106 Judd v. Rodman, \05 F.3d 1339,1341-42 (lith Cir. 1997). 
107 [d. at 1342. 
108 /d. at 1343. 
109 [d. (internal quotes omitted). 
110 See supra note 58. 
III It is unclear what the court meant when it determined that a relevance objection did not preserve this 
issue for appeal. Rule 412 is a relevance rule. Moreover, other courts have been far more aggressive in 
dealing with Rule 412 violations. See supra note 50. 
112 Judd, \05 F.3d at 1343. 
113 The Advisory Committee's notes state that "this amendment is designed to exclude evidence that does 
not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the proponent believes may have a sexual connotation 
for the fact finder." FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's notes. 
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because the plaintiff can continue in her profession as a nude dancer, it is more 
likely that she does not feel dirty than without the evidence. Perhaps the court 
has engaged in more offensive logic: because Ms. Judd engages in nude 
dancing, she has a less credible claim to "feeling dirty" than without the 
evidence. Both kinds of relevance logic rely on the now impermissible 
inference that one can use lifestyle evidence to extrapolate sexual behavior and 
belief. If we truly neutralize the sexually coded profession of nude dancer by 
substituting "bank teller," for example, the court's decision makes no sense. 
Her employment as a bank teller before and after the event would offer us no 
insight into whether her claim that she "felt dirty" was genuine. 
The Judd case demonstrates a significant loophole in the Rule 412 shield, 
as well as the judiciary's apparent discomfort with the strictures of revised 
Rule 412. Once a plaintiff proves sexual harassment, then damages are 
determined by assessing the injury of the individual victim. 114 The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 authorizes a claim for emotional distress. 1I5 The bulk of 
the money damages for these cases are likely claims of compensation for the 
mental distress that such sexual misconduct caused. I 16 Emotional distress 
claims provide a "legitimate" ground for defendants to seek information about 
the plaintiffs sexual history arguing that her sexual history may have caused 
her current distress rather than the sexually harassing work conditions. 117 New 
case law generated after the implementation of amended Rule 412 suggests 
that if the plaintiff asserts a claim for mental or emotional damages, then her 
sexual history and predisposition are more likely to be discoverable and 
h d . 'bl . I 118 per aps even a IlliSSI e at tna . 
114 See Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'l. 163 F.R.D. 617, 620 (D. Utah 1995). 
115 42 U.S.c. § 1981a (1994). 
116 See Ben Bursten, Psychiatric Injury in Women '05 Workplaces, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & 
L. 245, 247 (1986); Peggy Crull, Stress Effects 0/ Sexual Harassment on the Job: Implications/or Counseling, 
52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 539, 541 (1982). 
II 7 The Wall Street Journal describes a sex discrimination case brought by a Pulitzer Prize winning 
journalist against the newspaper at which she worked. Schultz & Woo, supra note 17, at AI. The Journal 
asserted that she was not paid commensurate with the male reporters and was denied a promotion because she 
complained of her treatment. /d. She also asserted damages for emotional distress. Id. The defendants 
discovered hundreds of pages about the plaintiffs sexual and emotional life, including her gynecological 
records from college. Id. They asked a free-lance photographer whom she had dated how often they had had 
sex. /d. They asked her therapists about her early sexual experiences, her sexual practices, and whether she 
was promiscuous. Id. She was asked in deposition whether she hated men and whether she had a "victim 
mentality" because she had been raped as a teenager. /d. 
118 See, e.g., Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., 1995 WL 117886 (N.D. III. Mar. 15, 1995); Ramirez v. 
Nabil's, Inc., 1995 WL609415, *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 5,1995); Bottomly, 163 F.R.D. at 620-21. 
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When exercising their discretion in the use of the Rule 412 balancing test, 
courts weigh unfair prejudice and potential harm to the victim. The Advisory 
Committee notes state that the reason for including "harm to the victim" is to 
"require the court to consider the legitimate privacy interests of the alleged 
victim.,,119 Yet, courts have taken a very limited view of privacy interests 
when balancing the intrusion against the probative value of sexual history in 
the context of damage claims. In essence, courts suggest that by bringing the 
sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff opened the door to this kind of evidence 
and therefore it is not a legitimate privacy interest. 120 If a claim for emotional 
damages can open the door to this kind of evidence, then the old disincentives 
to bring the cases reemerge. The stereotypes that make juries blame the victim 
will once again infect the fact-finding process. Thus, courts give the plaintiff a 
Hobson's choice: if she wants to ensure that her sexual past and lifestyle would 
not be presentable at trial, she will have to forego a large portion of her claim 
121 
for damages. 
119 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(4) advisory committee's notes. 
120 See, e.g., Gretzinger v. Univ. of Hawaii, 1198 WL 403357 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding the trial court's 
admission of evidence of plaintiffs sexual orientation and past affair); Hertenstein v. Kimberly Home Health 
Care, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 620 (D. Kan. 1999) (requiring plaintiff to submit to psychological examination 
inquiring into her sexual history); Ratts v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 189 FRO. 448 (D. Kan. 1999) (allowing 
deposition of plaintiff regarding sexual history). 
121 Even when a plaintiff attempts to dismiss claims for emotional distress in order to preclude this type of 
evidence, she may be thwarted. In McCieland v. Montgomery Ward & Co" Inc" the plaintiffs sued for 
damages caused by a sexually harassing work environment. 1995 WL 571324, *1 (N.D. III. Sept. 25,1995). 
The defendants sought to introduce evidence of the plaintiffs' childhood sexual abuse. /d. The plaintiffs 
asserted that this evidence was no longer relevant because they had dismissed the claims of damages for 
aggravation of their preexisting mental or psychological conditions or medical bills incurred as a result of their 
hospitalization. /d. The court found that such evidence was still relevant to their claim for damages for 
humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional and physical suffering. Id. at *2. Ironically, after determining that 
the evidence showing the plaintiffs' prior sexual abuse was more probative than prejudicial, the McLeland 
court refused to admit plaintiffs' evidence that the defendant had sexually harassed another employee, finding 
such evidence more prejudicial than probative. Id. at *3. 
The Wall Street Journal also reported the case of Margaret lensvold who made the decision not to assert 
emotional distress when she sued the National Institute of Mental Health alleging sex discrimination. Schultz 
& Woo, supra note 17, at AI. Nevertheless, the court allowed the defense to call her psychiatrist to testify 
about her past problems with men. Id. One of her witnesses was impeached by evidence that she was a 
member of a lesbian organization, while another witness was asked about her relationships with men, her past 
divorce, and the name and address of her therapist. /d. A pure sex discrimination claim does not constitute 
sexual misconduct. Therefore, Rule 412 would not stand as a bar to this kind of evidence in a pure sex 
discrimination case. 
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III. A PROPOSED RULE 
The problems enumerated above in ensuring a fair and consistent 
application of Rule 412 are the result of the Rule's reliance on judicial 
discretion. Courts interpret and apply law through the lens of their own 
experiences. Given nothing else to work with, it is likely that their lens will be 
as tainted by cultural biases as any other. If, instead, the civil rule mirrored the 
criminal rule-which outlines specific times in which evidence of a victim's 
sexual past could be introduced at trial-we might avoid much of the 
confusion that Rule 412's civil provision has engendered. Such a rule might 
look like the following: 
Retain 412(a)'s language indicating that such evidence is generally 
inadmissible. Strike Rule 412(b)(2) and replace with the following: 
(2) In a civil case, the following evidence is admissible, if 
otherwise admissible under these rules: 
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior 
by the alleged victim with respect to the alleged 
perpetrator; and 
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior 
by the alleged victim after an in camera showing 
by the proponent that such sexual conduct was the 
actual cause of the severe and emotionally 
devastating harm alleged in plaintiffs complaint. 
Subsection A is designed to indicate what evidence would be admissible to 
prove the defense of "welcomeness." Currently, the potency of Rule 412 relies 
on judicial discretion. As we have seen, however, what one court deems a non 
sequitur, another finds a legitimate line of inquiry-the probative value of 
which substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Admissibility depends on 
a balancing test administered by judges. Yet, the Supreme Court has already 
expressed its view that Rule 412 should not extend to civil cases. I22 Congress 
ignored this judicial input and adopted the Rule. Nonetheless, judges are not 
immune from the very views that prompted Congress to amend Rule 412 in the 
first place. 123 A judge may deem a piece of evidence highly probative in that it 
122 See supra note 23. 
123 Wright and Graham criticize the extension of the Rule. They offer the following comparison between 
its civil and criminal application when applying the sexual "predisposition" portion of the rule: 
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tends to confirm traditional notions about how women behave and therefore is, 
according to that lo~ic, a good predictor of the alleged victim's behavior on a 
specific occasion. 12 In Meritor, the Supreme Court glibly described the 
evidence of Vinson's dress and sexual fantasies as "obviously relevant." 125 
Once that relevance logic is adopted, the probative value of such evidence will 
always be regarded as considerable, and the harm to the victim will always be 
minimized. On the other hand, if the court follows the congressional mandate 
that assigning such probative value is impermissible, despite its intuitive 
appeal, then the harm to the victim will likely be judged significant. In either 
event, judicial discretion will be entitled to great deference upon appeal. 
Currently, the effectiveness of Rule 412 in the civil setting depends mostly 
upon the judge assigned the case. 126 This means that alleged victims of sexual 
misconduct will receive less protection than Congress intended. 127 Thus, 
subsection A of this proposed rule attempts to clarify the circumstances under 
which such evidence may have compelling relevance. It adopts the approach 
of many courts that reject evidence of a woman's voluntary sexual activity in 
the workplace as indicating welcomeness to the defendant's particular 
attentions. 128 Rather, the evidence will only be admissible if the defendant can 
show that such sexual behavior was directed toward him. 
It is preposterous to suppose that a person who wears a tank top and no brassiere is asking to be 
raped and exclusion of such evidence in criminal cases has been advocated in this Treatise. But 
transfer this definition to a civil action for sexual harassment. Is it unreasonable for the defendant 
to suppose that a woman who dresses to expose her breasts or a man who wears jeans so tight you 
can count the pimples on his buttocks is inviting others to look at these portions of their anatomy 
even though others, including the plaintiff, consider such a gaze sexual harassment? 
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5382.1 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). This comparison 
fails to recognize what constitutes sexual harassment and minimizes the plaintiffs burden of proof. 
124 Stereotypical reactions tend to operate without any consideration of the power imbalance that explains 
some behavior. Instead of analyzing reactions in context, the fact finder may slot them away in a category that 
fits their preordained expectations of how women behave. See, e.g., Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative 
Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149, 1177 (M.D. Pa. 1982). 
125 477 U.S. 57,69 (1986). 
126 Wright and Graham note: 
The expansion of the Rule to civil cases is less an expansion of protection to the victim than it is an 
expansion of the discretion of the trial judge. This might be fine for those, whether plaintiffs or 
defendants, who expect to be the beneficiaries of the trial judge's evidentiary largesse. But those 
who are at the moment on the politically less powerful side of the equation may find the protection 
of the Rule somewhat illusory. 
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5382.1 (internal footnotes omitted). 
127 See Bull, supra note 83, at 147-49 (demonstrating a judicial bias against plaintiffs). 
128 See, e.g., Howard v. Historic Tours, 177 F.R.D. 48, 52 ("There is such a gross disproportion between 
their voluntary sexual behavior and what they claim to have been subjected to that no reasonable jury could 
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Subsection B recognizes that sexual conduct by the plaintiff may be 
relevant to determine if the defendant actually caused the injury that plaintiff 
claims. Nevertheless, a claim for psychological damages should not eviscerate 
Rule 412's protection in sexual misconduct cases. Courts that take this tactic 
may be overvaluing the past sexual history in assessing damage causation. The 
plaintiff need not prove that the harasser's conduct is the sole cause of her 
injury. 129 Rather she need only show that such damage was substantially 
caused by defendant's conduct. This means that if the plaintiff can show that 
her present and relevant condition was substantially caused by the defendant's 
conduct, then the probative value of the defendant's excess information about 
the plaintiffs sexual history or predisposition becomes considerably less 
relevant. 130 The proposed rule attempts to provide guidance regarding when 
this sexual conduct evidence would likely be offered for its relevance rather 
than its harassment value. The proposed rule places the burden on the 
proponent of the evidence to show that the evidence it seeks to offer refers to 
actual causation. It is appropriate to place that burden on the proponent of the 
evidence because Rule 412 creates a general presumption against the admissi-
bility of sexual conduct or predisposition evidence. 
This portion of the rule is likely to be the most difficult because rebutting a 
claim of emotional distress damages has been the primary probative value that 
defendants' assert in the current balancing test. Nevertheless, some support for 
~equir~~g a more specific. s~owil~r can be fo~nd in. other areas dealing with 
ImposItIons on alleged victIms.' In cases III which a defendant seeks to 
compel a plaintiff to submit to an independent medical exam pursuant to Rule 
35(a), courts have required the defendant to show good cause for such an 
exam.132 In Fox v. Gates Corp., the District Court of Colorado held that when 
possibly find that they welcomed what they were subjected to, unless one is ready to concede the 
illogical-that a woman who engages in voluntary sexual behavior with one co-worker welcomes the sexual 
behavior of other co-workers no matter how reprehensible and gross it is. "). 
129 Proof of emotional distress damages is often difficult. A plaintiff must suffer harm from emotional 
distress. and the harm must be manifested by symptoms and often confirmed by an expert's testimony. 
However, the distress must also be reasonably foreseeable, meaning the plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
knew or should have known of the special factors affecting the plaintiff and his response to the circumstances 
of the case. See Pichowicz v. Hoyt, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2221, at '6 (D.N.H. Feb. II, 2000). Thus the 
reasonability of the distress is to be determined by the fact finder and the plaintiff bears the burden of 
persuasion. Id. at 6. 
130 Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'l, 163 F.R.D. 617,620 (D. Utah 1995). 
131 See Beth S. Frank, Protecting the Privacy of Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs: The Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege and Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 79 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 639 (2001). 
132 FED. R. CIv. P. 35(a). 
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a plaintiff makes a claim for emotional distress damages, the defendant must 
show good cause and give notice to the plaintiff before it would grant 
defendant's request for an independent psychiatric evaluation. 133 In granting 
such a motion, the court must determine if the defendant has made an 
affirmative showing that the plaintiff placed her mental condition in 
controversy.134 Factors courts use in deciding whether to require a plaintiff to 
submit to an independent medical exam include: plaintiff asserts a specific 
claim for negligent or intentional emotional distress damages; plaintiff alleges 
a specific mental or psychiatric disorder; plaintiff claims unusually severe 
emotional distress; plaintiff offers expert testimony in support of her emotional 
distress claim; and plaintiff concedes her mental condition is in controversy. 135 
The court in Fox denied the defendant's motion because the plaintiff made 
only a "garden variety" claim for emotional damages resulting from the 
defendant's refusal to hire her. 136 Moreover, the plaintiff said that she did not 
plan to introduce expert testimony in support of her claim. This, coupled with 
the fact that the plaintiff did not meet any of the above factors, led the court to 
deny the defendant's motion to compel the plaintiff to submit to an 
independent medical exam. 137 These factors, used to interpret Rule 35(a), give 
support for establishing a similar burden in the 412 context. 
CONCLUSION 
Rules of evidence designed to correct societal views that are thought to 
overvalue certain kinds of evidence should not be framed so that the judge 
must assess probative value in making the determination. We should not 
assume that the judiciary is free of the cultural preconceptions and biases that 
motivate the rule. The circularity of Rule 412's civil application has created 
inconsistent and unpredictable case law. The resulting inability to predict what 
evidence will be admissible has exacerbated the problem of discovery abuse. 
Courts are unable to predict what will and will not be admissible because a 
balancing test is inherently fact-dependent. Thus, they understandably err on 
the side of requiring disclosure. It makes sense to draw upon the twenty-five 
years of experience enjoyed by the criminal version of Rule 412 and craft a 
rule that delineates the general prohibition against such evidence but articulates 
133 179 F.R.D. 303, 307 (D. Co. 1988). 
134 {d. 
135 {d. 
136 /d. at 307-08. 
137 {d. at 308. 
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the particular exceptions. As a result, one could anticipate that the evidence 
would be used not as a tool for dissuading victims of sexual misconduct but 
because such evidence is necessary for a fair consideration of the claims. 
